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Abstract
The traditional approach to criminal justice faces the challenge of balancing
multiple goals – usually expressed as deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilita-
tion, and retribution – which focus on crime control. A restorative approach
seems needed in all societies that have suffered massive and collective
victimisation, and must be kept in mind in Rwanda by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as it implements its overall strategy.
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The ICTR’s almost exclusive focus on an actor-orientated perspective, viewing
the individual as a building block of the genocidal reality, distorts and
obscures a structure-orientated perspective on the ethno-centric social reality
that converted tens of thousands of Hutus into a mass of killers, turning on
their friends, neighbours and colleagues. The main focus for the punishment
of war criminals must remain at the national level, although the existence of
an international tribunal legitimises the criminalisation of internal atrocities.
The ugliness of internal strife and the political reality of the ethnic hatred
cannot be isolated in an international courtroom for resolution.
1. Introduction
The end of the Cold War, which paralysed the UN from its inception, was a
cause for celebration and hope. Following the historic Security Council
Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction ‘among
nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the
great objectives of the UN Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of
promoting, in the words of the Charter, “social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom”.’1 Even as this optimistic mission statement 
was being made, the Balkans erupted into a theatre of war and Rwanda’s
genocidal conflagration was in the making. Organisation and planning was
certainly at work in Rwanda, where an estimated one million people from a
total population of 7.5 million were slaughtered in less than three months.2
The horror of civil war in the Balkans generated a particular urgency in
the West to do something to mask the appearance of disorder and moral
collapse on its periphery. With the United States as lead lobbyist and
financier,3 two ad hoc international criminal tribunals were established,
1 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, UN GAOR, 47th
Sess, para 3, UN Doc A/47/277, S/24111 (1992).
2 See The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, UN SCOR, 49th
Sess, 3453rd mtg, at 14, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994).
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ostensibly to restore order to the former Yugoslavia4 and as an afterthought, 
to Rwanda.5 Hailed by UN leadership as moral progress (Annan 1997:
363,365),6 these institutions were to merge our humanitarian instincts with a
purported administrative capacity to control deviant behaviour. Virtually
overnight, the capacity of the international community to punish in a
presumptively non-discriminatory and salubrious manner grew exponen-
tially, with scant philosophical reflection or historical depth (Gustafson
1998:51,53). 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda grew out of the
response of the UN human rights system to the Rwandan tragedy. Parallel to
the efforts within the UN human rights system, the government of Rwanda
that came to power by toppling the genocidal regime7 made a request to the
UN Security Council for assistance to bring those responsible for the genocide
to justice.8 Based on its concern that the serious and extensive human rights
violations in Rwanda would disrupt international peace and security,9 the
Security Council invoked its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter and
established the ICTR.10
3 See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, US Efforts to Promote Human
Rights and Democracy, Pub No 11769 (1997) 2.
4 See UN SCOR, 48th Sess, 3217th mtg at 2, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993).
5 See UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg at 2, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994). For those
unacquainted with the Nuremberg precedent for international criminal tribunals, the
late professor Telford Taylor, a chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, has written a defini-
tive account (Taylor 1992). The mass of literature written on the legal issues
surrounding the international court for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and a perma-
nent international criminal court dissuades me from rehashing the legal debate. For
a sample of literature on the subject, see generally Akhavan 1996:501,
Bhattacharyya 1996:57, Hochkammer 1995:119, Marquardt 1995:73, McCormack
1997:681, Morris 1997:349, Sunga 1995:121, Meier Wang 1995:177.
6 ‘These tribunals have made significant progress and are setting an important precedent.’
7 The Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in July 1994. For an overview, see Prunier
1997a:193.
8 Letter Dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNSCOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc
S/1994/1115, at 4 (1994).
9 Serious human rights violations implicate Chapter VII jurisdiction. See Beres
1993:325, Tocker 1994:527.
10 The ICTR, with jurisdiction over human rights crimes committed from 1 January
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The Security Council’s resolution establishing the ICTR articulates a set
of decisions, assumptions, wishes, and objectives.11 States serving on the
Security Council participated in the debate creating the ICTR. Remarkably,
though voting for the most part in favour of the resolution creating the ICTR,
the States articulated various objectives, or perhaps more importantly
perspectives, which in many ways could be construed to be in conflict with
each other.12 Primarily, the States that voted in favour of the creation of the
ICTR indicated that the root of the problem was individual violations of inter-
national criminal law. Only one State that voted for the resolution did not
equate ipso facto ICTR actions with justice. That State considered the ICTR
only one of the many tasks at hand for the international community. The ICTR
was merely a vehicle of justice, ‘but it is hardly designed as a vehicle for
reconciliation.... Reconciliation is a much more complicated process’ (Czech
Republic).13 Interestingly, Rwanda, which voted against the resolution, spoke
of the problem in terms of a culture of impunity.14 The Rwandan delegate used
words with implications different from those linked to individual wrongdoing.
The UN paid little to no heed to the subtle, but extremely different way in
which the problem was characterised and the implications this would have on
the type of tool needed to deal with that problem.15
The potential contribution of the ICTR to national reconciliation in
Rwanda depends on understanding the root causes of the 1994 genocide. It is
1994, through 31 December 1994, is based in Arusha, Tanzania. It is one of the two
ad hoc tribunals established by the UN to bring human rights criminals to justice.
The ICTR’s complete name is International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwanda Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and other such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994. See SC Res 955.
The other ad hoc tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia. See SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th Sess, 3217th mtg, at 1, UN Doc
S/Res/827 (1993). See also Johnson 1996:211, Sunga 1995.
11 SC Res 955. 
12 For the views of the various States, see UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg, UN Doc
S/PV.3453 (1994) 2-10.
13 UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994) 7.
14 UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994) 14.
15 The ICTR’s sister tribunal in Yugoslavia, the ICTFY, was clearer about what it
believed to be its objectives by interpreting its mandate from the Security Council.
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obvious that an essential ingredient of this tragedy was historical rivalry and
ethnic fear between Hutu and Tutsi.16 But this ingredient was not sufficient.
For the tragedy to take place, it was necessary to transform these tensions into
systematic mass violence, a feat that could only be achieved through careful
planning and execution under the direction of political elites. It is imperative
that the ICTR clarify goals lest, in the words of Michael Reisman (1995:175),
‘we fall victim to a judicial romanticism in which we imagine that merely by
creating entities we call ‘courts’ we have solved major problems’. Of course,
the aim of achieving justice, which has no empirical referent, is clearly not an
adequate response. In discharging its burden, the ICTR should keep in mind
Holmes’s admonition against blind guesses (Holmes 1997:989,100217). 
While courts are needed to enforce law, courts do not and cannot make
human rights real. The achievement of human rights is a much more complex
process than the establishment of a court. While the Rwanda tribunal
responds to the lawyer’s gradualist approach to institutional and normative
development of international criminal law, thus far it has failed to successfully
address the basic purposes for which it was established, to end impunity and
deter potential offenders. It has been hampered by conceptual considerations. 
To delve more deeply into the ICTR’s handicap in addressing the human
rights situation in Rwanda through the international penal process, this
article makes use of a distinction in looking at human, social or for that matter
They are, to bring to justice those responsible; to contribute to ensuring that such
violations are halted and effectively redressed by acting as a powerful deterrent to all
parties against continued participation in inhuman acts; to gradually promote an end
to armed hostilities; to be a tool for promoting reconciliation by working to attribute
acts to individuals and thereby provide justice to individual victims to diminish
group hatred and the need for revenge. See The Annual Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, in ICTFY Year Book (1994) 81, 86-87, UN Sales No
E.95.III.P.2. The UN Legal Counsel Carl August Fleischhauer stated that the
tribunal was set up with three aims: ending war crimes, bringing perpetrators to
justice, and breaking the cycle of ethnic violence and retribution. See Kelly
1993:52.
16 For an excellent overview of the historical roots of the rivalry between Hutu and
Tutsi, see Prunier 1995:9-40.
17 Republishing Holmes’s March 25, 1897 speech on its centennial. ‘What have we




world affairs: actor-orientated and structure-orientated perspectives (Galtung
1994:26-49). These perspectives can be seen as two ways of reflecting, and
reflecting on, social affairs and legal tradition, each of them focusing on
different aspects. The legal paradigm (especially criminal law) is biased in
favour of the actor-oriented perspective due to its simplistic concreteness,
identification of the evil actor, apprehension and prosecution. This article
sets out (in Part 1) to consider how far the ICTR has fulfilled its objectives,
which transcend the prosecution and conviction of guilty persons. The
contention is that the ICTR still has not made the most of its opportunity to
facilitate change. The article explains some of the reasons why the ICTR has
not fulfilled this opportunity.
Part 2 of the article provides a tour d’horizon of Rwanda’s history, aimed
at bringing to light the constructed ethnicity and the infusion of ethno-centric
hatred. Part 3 of the article discusses why the Court needs to focus on a struc-
ture-oriented perspective to complement its current overemphasis on an
actor-oriented perspective in the ongoing effort to achieve respect for a
human rights culture in Rwanda in order to maximise its social impact in
Rwanda. This is particularly so, given the opinions voiced by many Hutu
refugees that no atrocities occurred at all, or that any atrocities that did occur
were brought on by the Tutsis themselves. 
Part 4 of the article discusses the inappropriateness of the classical
criminal law paradigms adopted by the ICTR in its judicial operations,
pointing out that the objectives that come with these paradigms do not have
much relevance for the Rwandese situation. Part 4 also explores the restora-
tive dimension of justice as a possible viable instrumentality in achieving the
ICTR’s objectives.
2. Constructing Ethnicity: A Tour d’Horizon of 
Rwanda’s History
The genocide of 1994 was anything but a surprise for the international
community. It was the culmination of many years of cynical indifference and
wilful blindness to the plight of the Rwandan people. In the words of the
Rwandan representative to the Security Council: ‘Since 1959 Rwanda has
repeatedly experienced collective massacres, which, as early as 1964, were
described by Pope Paul VI and two Nobel Prize winners – Bertrand Russell
and Jean-Paul Sartre – as the most atrocious acts of genocide this century
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after that of the Jews during the Second World War. But whenever such
tragedies occurred the world kept silent and acted as though it did not 
understand that there was a grave problem of the violation of human rights.’18
Thus in 1994, the international community became a spectator to an
archetypal genocide, the attempted extermination of an entire people. The
tragedy that befell Rwanda in 1994 deserves a special place in the blood-
stained pages of history.19 The Rwandan genocide merits distinction primarily
because of its shocking efficiency, its scale and its proportional dimensions
among the victim population.20
Prior to the genocide, the population of Rwanda consisted of an estimated
85 per cent Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi, and 1 per cent Twa and other.21 As far back
as the fifteenth century, the Rwanda-Burundi area was ruled by monarchic
clans. Prior to the colonial era, political tensions in Rwanda were not particu-
larly accentuated along ethnic lines. The Hutu and Tutsi together comprise the
Banyarwanda, ‘people of Rwandan extraction’ (Prunier 1997b:400), and speak
the same language, Kinyarwanda, without differences in dialect or vocabulary
(Prunier 1997b:400-407). Historically, both groups were socially fluid, with
intra-societal divisions operating more along clan lines than ‘ethnic’ lines
(Prunier 1997b:15,370).22 As Gourevitch notes, Hutu and Tutsi ‘intermarried,
18 UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994), 13-14.
19 The UN Special Rapporteur observed in 1994: ‘The Rwandese have indeed been the
victims of a number of massacres in the past, notably in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973,
1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. However, those being perpetrated at present are
unprecedented in the history of the country and even in that of the entire African
continent. They have taken on an extent unequalled in space and in time.’ Report of
the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr R Degni-Sequi, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN ESCOR Commission on Human
Rights, 51st Sess, Prov Agenda Item 12, para 24, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994)
para 20.
20 The number of persons killed throughout the territory is to be numbered in the
hundreds of thousands, estimates ranging from 200 000 to 500 000. In fact, even the
latter figure is probably less than the reality. Some observers think that the figure is
close to a million. It is not sure that the exact number of victims will ever be known.
21 The indigenous Twa minority was the first people to populate the area of Rwanda as
far back as 2000 BC Around 3 000 years later, a migration of Hutu to the area began.
People of Tutsi extraction began to migrate to the area around 1500 AD Traditionally,
the Hutu have been agrarian and sedentary whereas the Tutsi have been cattle-
owners and nomadic.
22 Where a glossary of Rwandan terms is provided.
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and lived intermingled, without territorial distinctions, on the same hills,
sharing the same social and political culture’ (Gourevitch 1998:47). 
As the nineteenth century drew to an end, Germany began to assert
indirect colonial rule over Rwanda and Burundi with only a very small 
presence through the tactic of ‘divide and rule’. The reinforcement and
manipulation of the ruling elites in Rwanda formed an important element of
Germany’s colonial policy from 1897 to 1916 (See generally Destehexhe
1995:39-47. During the First World War, Germany lost control over the area
to Belgium, which then ruled Rwanda from 1916 to 1962. Belgium adminis-
tered Rwanda under the League of Nations mandates system, pursuant to
Article 22 of the League Covenant, and then, following dissolution of the
League of Nations on 18 April 1946, as a United Nations Trust Territory. 
As Germany had done, Belgium reinforced the centuries-old Tutsi monarchy
in Rwanda through a system of patron-client control, favouring the minority
Tutsi people as the ruling class, partly on the grounds that the Tutsi people
originated from the Nile River region, were somehow ‘more European’ in
character than the Hutu people, and therefore, were supposedly superior as
well.23
The Belgians believed the apparent physical distinctions between the
Hutus and Tutsis represented anthropological differences related to group
ancestry (see Des Forges 1999:16). From this grew the constructed nature of
ethnicity in Rwanda. The construction was consolidated by the introduction
in 1933 of mandatory ‘“ethnic” identity cards,’ which each Rwandan was
obliged to carry (see Gourevitch 1998:56-57).24 These cards made the lines
between Tutsi and Hutu official and impenetrable (Destehexhe 1995)25 and
23 See e.g. Pierre Ryckmans, Dominer Pour Servir (1931:26), quoted by Prunier
(1995:9): ‘The Batutsi were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to
give them a great prestige vis-à-vis the inferior races which surround…It is not
surprising that those good Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous,
more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt.’ 
24 See also Human Rights Watch, Playing the ‘Communal Card’: Communal Violence
and Human Violence (1995) 1-2 (describing the system of identity cards).
25 Detailing the imposition of identity categories and concluding that identity cards
were the basic instrument of the genocide. In the early days of colonialism, the
Belgians favoured the Tutsi, elevating them to important positions within the colonial
state. Closer to the time of independence, the Belgians promoted Hutu to important
positions, ostensibly to prepare the nation for the majority-based democratic society
that would emerge after independence.
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established the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi as a cornerstone of
Belgian colonial rule. The colonial introduction of ethnic identity cards,
patronage based on ethnic group membership, and the European fascination
with the anthropological origins of Hutu and Tutsi led to what Chabal and
Daloz (1999:57) call the ‘invention of ethnicity’. By this they do not mean that
‘[ethnic] affiliations did not exist prior to colonial rule but simply that they
were reconstructed during that period according to the vagaries of the interac-
tion between colonial rule and African accommodation’ (Chabal & Daloz
1999:57). 
After the Second World War ended, Rwandan Hutus pushed for demo-
cratic reforms, a goal supported by the Belgian Government. Tutsis not only
opposed Belgium’s proposed democratic reforms, which threatened to under-
mine Tutsi positions of privilege and power, but also intensified a drive for
national independence from Belgium. In November 1959, the heightened
resentment between the two groups took the form of open hostilities. Several
hundred Tutsis were massacred, which in turn sparked a mass exodus of thou-
sands of Tutsis from Rwanda, mostly to Uganda and Zaire.
In 1961, the Rwandan monarchy, which had existed for centuries, was
abolished by overwhelming popular demand through a national referendum
and replaced by a republican form of Government. On 26 October 1961,
Gregoire Kayibanda, leader of Parmehutu (Party for the Emancipation of the
Hutu people), was formally elected President of the newly formed Parliament
of the Republic of Rwanda, and maintained political control until 1973. 
On 1 July 1962, Rwanda achieved independence. Hutu and Tutsi, fairly
benign constructs until Rwandan independence, quickly changed (and were
changed) to define political cleavages and foster enmity. In the early 1960s,
violence was never absent from the scene. Particularly large-scale massacres
were perpetrated in 1963 and 1966, mainly against Tutsis.
In July 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu from the north of Rwanda,
seized control of the Government, and in 1975, formed the National
Revolutionary Movement for Development. The Hutu government of Juvenal
Habyarimana, which ruled Rwanda from 1973, exploited and politicised the
inter-ethnic tensions that had been simmering since Rwandan independence
in 1960 (see Des Forges 1999:3-5). Although Habyarimana promised to
create a fair balance between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, he banned all oppo-
sition political parties except his own, and in 1978, changed the Constitution
to make Rwanda officially a one-party State.
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Motivated to regain their former position of prestige in the country, and
concerned to aid their brothers and sisters in Rwanda from the recurrent
violence perpetrated against them, Tutsi paramilitary forces coalesced into the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF launched small-scale incursions
from neighbouring countries into Rwandese territory in order to force
Habyarimana towards power sharing. On 1 October 1990, the insurgent RPF
crossed the Ugandan border and carried out several military operations in the
north of Rwanda. Out of revenge, Hutu groups killed some 300 Tutsis in the
following weeks.26 By 1992, over 350 000 persons had fled the violence in the
northern regions of Rwanda, becoming displaced in the interior of Rwanda.
By 1993, it must have been clear to the Habyarimana Government that
the RPF had become an insurgency movement capable of destabilising
Rwanda and that it would be prudent to explore the possibilities of a cease-
fire. On the other side, RPF commanders were obliged to negotiate with the
Government in order to translate small-scale military victories into longer
lasting political success. Negotiations between the Government of Rwanda
and the RPF commenced at Arusha, Tanzania, on 10 August 1992. The main
issues to be addressed at the Arusha peace negotiations were: the need for
multi-party elections and power sharing in Rwanda; the fostering of peace and
respect for the rule of law; and an end to the RPF insurgency. These negotia-
tions did not bear fruit immediately.
While the Arusha Accords were considered by many as the first sign of
effective power sharing, they also bolstered the accusations made by
extremist Hutu elements that the Habyarimana regime was merely a puppet
of foreign Tutsi interests who threatened to regain direct control over the
Government. In the final months of 1993, these extremist Hutu elements
began to plan the elimination of the Tutsi people by training groups of 300
persons (the Interahamwe), in methods of systematic slaughter.
In early April 1994, President Habyarimana flew to Dar es Salaam to
attend a meeting with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, Kenyan
Vice-President George Saitoti, Burundian President Cyprien Ntayamira, and
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, concerning the maintenance of peace
and security in the region. On 6 April, following the meeting, the President of
26 See generally Misser 1995 for a series of interviews conducted with the Vice-
President and Minister of Defence of the Government of Rwanda, Major-General
Paul Kagame.
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Rwanda returned by jet to Kigali accompanied by the President of Burundi
who intended to continue on to Bujumbura. As the presidential aircraft
circled Kigali airport to land, it was shot down. All those aboard, including
Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntyamira, several ministers and their
entourages, died in the crash.
The downing of the aircraft triggered massacres throughout the country.
Within thirty to forty minutes of the aircraft crash, roadblocks were set up in
Kigali by Hutu militia, at which identity cards were checked, Tutsis singled
out, and murdered on the spot. The immense slaughter plunged Rwanda into
total chaos. United Nations inactivity and acquiescence to the genocide is
damning. There were credible reports that the United Nations peacekeeping
force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been present to facilitate the peace
negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF, apparently knew
that genocide might take place but the UN took no preventive action.27
The massacres continued, perpetrated mainly by extremist Hutu militia
associated with Habyarimana’s political party, the Coalition for the Defence
of the Republic, members of the Presidential Guard and regular army forces
of the then Government of Rwanda. The slaughter required extensive admin-
istrative and logistical planning, evidenced by the chillingly calculated and
thorough way in which it was carried out, and by the fact that most of the
victims – between 500 000 and 1 million mainly Tutsi persons as well as
politically moderate Hutu leaders and their families28 – were killed over the
relatively short period from 6 April through the first three weeks of May 1994.
This death toll amounts to roughly ten per cent of the Rwandan national
population.29 Notwithstanding the ‘low-tech’ nature of the massacres (see
Morris 1997:350),30 ‘[t]he dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times
27 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1995 (1994) 41. See generally Joint Evaluation
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Vols I-V (March 1996). This is
collaborated by Report of the Independent Inquiry Into Rwanda Report, below n 91.
28 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, referred to in note 19
above, at para 24.
29 See Gourevitch 1998:4: ‘Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a
population, and in the spring and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres
decimated the Republic of Rwanda.’




the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass
killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’ (Gourevitch
1998:4).31 In this sense, the genocide was well organised, co-ordinated, and
administered; it was anything but spontaneous and random.32
Immediately preceding and during the Rwandan genocide, the political
instrumentalisation of ethnicity was so focused and so pointed that Hutu were
led to believe – and many actually believed – that they were doing good by
killing Tutsi. The genocide was not about ethnic identity operating as a 
constitutive element of Rwandans’ personal identity. Rather, the genocide was
about ethnicity operating coercively as the unwavering, singular expression of
good or evil, of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Drumbl 2000:1221,1294). 
Shortly after the Hutu extremists launched the genocide, the RPF
undertook a military offensive, moving from Uganda into northern Rwanda.
By mid-July 1994, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, the RPF was able to
halt the genocide, force the retreat of the former Government of Rwanda and
associated militia from Kigali, and assert effective control over the rest of
Rwandese territory.
The article now turns to an examination of the actor-orientated and
structure-orientated perspectives by setting out the disjunction between actor
and structure by the ICTR in its conceptual operations. The view that the
ICTR is dealing with an event rather than a state of affairs is particularly
misleading and distorts the overall vision and dialectics necessary for the
ICTR to contribute to the establishment of human rights culture in Rwanda.
31 ‘That’s three hundred and thirty-three and a third murders an hour – or five and a half
lives terminated every minute’ (Gourevitch 1998:133). Of course, to these numbers
have to be added the ‘uncounted legions who were maimed but did not die of their
wounds, and the systematic and serial rape of Tutsi women’ (Gourevitch 1998:133), in
order to fully grasp the numbers of aggressive participants and victims in the genocide.
32 Most of the individuals responsible for carrying out violations of human rights and
humanitarian law fled the country amongst the over 2 million that sought refuge in
the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania, for fear of possible Tutsi
reprisals and revenge attacks. Numerous criminal suspects fled to Francophone West
African countries, as well as to Kenya, and as far away as Belgium, Canada, France,
Switzerland and the United States.
33 Gramsci is specifically relevant for Rwanda, given the extreme level of social
conformism that characterised pre-genocide Rwanda. Gramsci argues that retribu-
tion or any other punishment objective that does not account for the reintegration of
offenders back into society tends to reinforce social conformism, which is normally
useful to the ruling group’s interest.
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3. A Crippling Flaw: The Disjunction between Actor 
and Structure
Prosecuting a case in violation of the rules just to obtain a conviction may not
necessarily alleviate the human rights situation. Assumptions about the
system’s role in achieving that society’s objectives underlie each State’s
justice system (see Gramsci 1971).33 Some are based on a Hobbesian notion
(see MacPherson 1985), while others are based on a social contract ideal (see,
e.g. Tyler 1990). Each country’s penal system is unique with differing values
and differing ideas as to how to realise those values.34 Given that the concep-
tualisation and operation of the ICTR falls to the UN, a complex tapestry of
legal systems is implicated. Thus, there are different assumptions attempting
to coexist about human behaviour and the penal system’s role in regulating,
modifying, or augmenting values.
The first prosecutor of the ICTR held views that are generally similar to
those of many within the prosecutorial profession. He believed the fear of
detection, financial penalties, and indignities of guilt were at the centre of
criminal justice. Like most prosecutors, he placed the judicial response at the
top of the hierarchy. ‘Yet as all criminal lawyers will agree, detection and
punishment are the only means by which to curb criminal conduct’
(Goldstone 1997:1,2). From this perspective the ICTR prosecution office is
largely focused on what to do with the evil actors, and the answer is neces-
sarily threefold: converting them to better intentions, weakening them by
depriving them of capability and/or making them more passive in general.
The rude reality though is that the trials and convictions of 53 indictees35 on
the ICTR’s list of shame will not have some kind of legal domino effect on the
acts and intents on the rest of the perpetrators numbering tens of thousands,
many of whom are active in guerrilla-style military incursions against the
Tutsi-dominated government in power. 
Obviously the mass murders in Rwanda did not arise spontaneously.
34 See UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, The United Nations and
Crime Prevention - Seeking Security and Justice for All (1996) 3-4. Some States may
not have enough information or the capacity to realise the underlying objectives of
the law.
35 See ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the ICTR’, 19 October 2000, Doc.




They were instigated by persons in positions of power who sought to gain
personal advantages through violent and hideous means. Unless these
persons are held accountable for their crimes against humanity, the reconcili-
ation necessary for the reconstruction of this torn society may not be possible.
By assigning guilt to the leader-instigators, the tribunal may also lift the
burden of collective guilt that settles on the Hutus, whose leaders directed or
ordered such terrible violence. The assignment of guilt by a neutral tribunal
also may enable the international community to differentiate between victims
and aggressors. However the international justice process must not erase the
fact that the inter-ethnic conflict, while not genetically inbred, is firmly
embedded in the socio-cultural structure and subconscious mind of the
Rwandese society, and thus addressing these structural defects is part of the
process of deterrence.
Sole focus on the ICTR indictees is unrealistic and demonstrates that the
Tribunal is unclear about why the Court exists and how the Court could make
its modest contribution for the betterment of human rights in the region
(Howland & Calathes 1998:135,148). There is an abundance of the ‘evil’ ones,
those who have already through their acts proved that they are evil, as well as
those who may be suspected of harbouring evil intentions. The causes of the
Rwandese tragedy rest with them, expressed in their acts or threats or general
inclination to engage in evil acts, but the fact is that the international penal
process will only try a minuscule fraction of the whole group of perpetrators,
the indictees.36 So many people were killed principally because there were so
many killers. Significant numbers of Rwandans perpetrated the bloodbath.
What induced so many individuals to participate was not coercion, but rather
genuine support of the idea that the Tutsi had to be eliminated, together with
the pursuit of solidarity with others in attaining this goal. This belief that one
was doing right by killing might explain why so many of the killings were so
brutal.37 It may be that there was little courage in Rwanda simply because
most people were not actually opposed to the genocide.38 To the contrary, many
36 One Africanist estimates that the number of Rwandans directly involved in the acts
of killing amounted to between 75 000 and 150 000 (Jefremovas 1995:28). 
37 For case studies of such incidents, see Human Rights Watch/Africa et al., Shattered
Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath (1996) 42-
68; see also Prunier 1997a:255-57 (describing types of brutal acts committed).
38 Although some Tutsi were ‘saved’ through Hutu intervention, many of these ‘saved’
Tutsi were not spared because of intellectual or structural opposition to genocide, but
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people may have believed that killing the Tutsi was a civic duty – in other
words, nothing less than the right thing to do.39 The indirect or direct partici-
pation of so many people in the Rwandan genocide blurs the line between
guilt and innocence. An even larger number of people acquiesced in the face
of genocide. In Rwanda, the killings were committed publicly and were known
to all.40 They ‘did not take place at out-of-the-way sites…[but] throughout the
country: in virtually every village and in almost every urban neighbourhood’
(Neier 1999:48). 
Not surprising, the ICTR’s existence and presence in Eastern Africa has
done little to deter extremist Hutus in neighbouring countries from waging
bloody guerrilla-style excursions into Rwanda. Thousands of unarmed civil-
ians have been killed across the border, in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), in an armed conflict involving several governments, including
Rwanda, as well as various armed opposition groups, including Rwandese
Interahamwe militia and soldiers of the former Rwandese armed forces. The
Rwandese government continues to offer support to the rebel Rally for
Congolese Democracy (RCD), part of the deal being permission to conduct
military operations in Congolese territory against Hutu extremists. The
overzealous Rwandese government troops have not been averse to conducting
ruthless military operations around refugee camps (Amnesty International
2000), reinforcing its apparent commitment to consolidating a national
ethnocracy. The same zeal is reflected by the Hutu extremists keen to wrestle
back the reins of power from the Tutsi dominated government. Arguably their
main grievance is not the brand of politics or style of governance of the
government of the day, but rather, the ethnic composition, which they see as
destroying Hutu ethnic hegemony spanning over three decades (since inde-
pendence in 1961).
In order to perform the genocide, the Hutu leaders over the years
succeeded in organising a campaign that redefined the Tutsis (the victim
rather because of idiosyncratic convenience. See Gourevitch 1998:130, stating that:
Many people who participated in the killing – as public officials, as soldiers or
militia members, or as ordinary citizen butchers – also protected some Tutsis,
whether out of personal sympathy or for financial or sexual profit. It was not
uncommon for a man or a woman who regularly went forth to kill to keep a few
favourite Tutsis hidden in his or her home.
39 For a description of slaughter as civic duty in Butare prefecture, see Des Forges 1999:515.
40 Des Forges 1999:770 (discussing broad advertisement of killings).
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group) as worthless, outside the web of mutual obligations, a threat to the
Hutu hegemony, and in the run-up to the 1994 genocidal conflagration, as
subhuman. Even after such a campaign of vilification and dehumanisation41
the actual performance of the mass killing required a good deal of coercion
and centralised control that converted a large segment of the Hutu populace
into a band of mass killers and thus criminals. While much has been said
about the pragmatic dimension of punishing mass human rights violations
through prosecutions as a preventive measure, no paradigm has yet been set
out in relation to the task of post-conflict peace-building which entails a
psychological dimension of justice and reconciliation. 
The ICTR’s almost exclusive focus on concrete entities, perceiving the
individual actor as a building block of the genocidal reality, distorts and
obscures the structural reality that converted tens of thousands of Hutus into a
mass of killers, turning on their friends, neighbours and colleagues
(Jefremovas 1995:28). The 1994 genocide followed three earlier rounds of
massacres targeting Tutsis in 1959, 1963 and 1966.42 The 1994 bloodbath was
preceded by a macabre dress rehearsal in 1992.43 With preparations complete,
in 1994 the government was able to manipulate the structure founded on a
sharp, ethno-centric rift by fuelling the hatred through national radio (Radio
Television Libre des Mille Collines) broadcasts that dehumanised the Tutsis
41 The renowned African scholar, Ali A Mazrui (1986:243), noted that ‘violations of
human rights are preceded by a process of psychic sub humanisation’ by which the
violator ‘sub humanises his victim in his own imagination,’ although ‘residual
humanity is often necessary to give meaning to the sin of inter-human cruelty’. Such
dehumanisation, he explained, is the ‘reverse of the psychology of love’ because no
human being can love a non-human object ‘unless the object undergoes psychic
humanization in the imagination of the lover’. When someone loves her dog ‘it is
because the dog has been, in some sense, anthropomorphized,’ and when someone
loves his ‘motherland’ it is because his imagination ‘has invoked a metaphor of
human kinship’ with the territory. The psychology of hate, on the other hand, requires
‘a partial reduction of humanity’. Since it is difficult to hate an inanimate object or
animal, the most fertile soil for hatred is that ‘intermediate area of sub-humanity’ or
‘tendency on the part of the hater to reduce the humanity of the person hated’. 
42 See note 19 above.
43 On 1 October 1990, the insurgent RPF crossed the Ugandan border and carried out
several military operations in the north of Rwanda. Out of revenge, Hutu groups
killed some 300 Tutsis in the following weeks. By 1992, over 350 000 persons 
had fled the violence in the northern regions of Rwanda, becoming displaced in the
interior of Rwanda.
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as ‘inyenzi’ (cockroaches),44 facilitating the creation of an effective killing
machine that stretched from the city suburbs to villages and remote farms. 
This process of dehumanisation was a contrivance of populist leaders
which fed on the primitive impulse to denigrate the Tutsis as a means of self-
affirmation. Before ordinary Hutus could participate in the slaughter of
defenceless children, the Tutsi had to be portrayed as an inherently blood-
thirsty and cruel people who were out to break the Hutu hegemony through
violence, and thus it was necessary to launch preventive measures, which
incidentally took the form of preventive violence. The Hutus were spurred on
by exhortations appealing to them as a collectivity to preserve their ethnic
hegemony by eliminating all sympathisers and supporters of the RPF whose
military successes had forced the government to the negotiation table. 
For many, the ICTR will establish individual guilt and thereby move
suspicion and blame from the group to the individual. It is a laudable goal, but
a complex one in the circumstances. For crimes to be crimes there must be
individual acts. These crimes may or may not be part of a criminal enterprise.
When a crime is part of a criminal enterprise, the nature of the relation
between the individual, the crime, and society profoundly changes.45 Any
penal response to a criminal enterprise must understand the entire crime and
its relation to society to begin to address it effectively through the justice
system.46
44 The term ‘inyenzi’ is Kinyarwanda for cockroaches. The widespread use of the term
in radio broadcasts was initially to denounce supporters and sympathisers of the
Rwanda Patriotic Front (overwhelmingly Tutsis and moderate Hutus). In time it
conferred the de facto meaning of ‘persons to be killed’. Within the context of the
Civil War of 1994, the term ‘inyenzi’ became synonymous with the term ‘Tutsi’. See
the Ruggiu Judgment, The Prosecutor v Georges Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32 at para 44.
45 When people engage in crime as a series or pattern of illegal acts which result in an
uneven or incomplete meting out of punishment, some implicit or explicit accommo-
dation must be made within any criminal justice system. This process of
compromising law enforcement involves a wide range of considerations with direct
impact on the organisational pattern and structure, which can be traced to the nature
of law itself. See McCaghy & Cenkovich 1987.
46 Criminal enterprise behaviour is a type of behaviour that invariably arises as a
natural social phenomenon in nearly every society. It is a social epidemic that takes
different forms at different times across these societies, but because its etiology so
differs from that of individual criminal behaviour, its effect on society and its
demand of a response from the justice system is markedly different as well. Crime as
part of a criminal enterprise almost always results in selective and discriminatory
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Within the ICTR’s framework of thinking, the genocidal acts by
extremist Hutus are seen as an event, not a state of affairs; something that was
and is lurking, and probably will continue to lurk in the sub-consciousness of
the extremists. It may be a slowly or quickly changing state of affairs,
depending on the circumstances, key among which is the process of the
extremists reclaiming back political and military authority in Rwanda. The
war in Rwanda is unfinished; there was not even a temporary respite after the
genocide, before the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for the control of the State resumed.
There is little doubt in this context that the ICTR is seen by Hutus as interna-
tional punishment by the victors, Tutsis, with the blessing and support of the
United Nations.47 Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide
trials they are conducting in Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge
(Akhavan 1996:508).48 For that reason, the ICTR, since it is not part of an
overall political settlement of the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for political power, is
virtually irrelevant to the future of Rwanda (Lowell 1995:23-25).
enforcement of laws. The use of discretion in dealing with these offences by a crim-
inal justice system offers an opportunity for criminal forces to strongly influence the
justice process itself. In a sense, a functional ‘tolerance policy’ by law enforcement
bureaucracies may develop and often does. When responding to crime as part of a
criminal enterprise, social control bureaucracies are confronted with the vexing
problem of enforcing laws about which little, sporadic, or inconsistent social
consensus among society’s many groups may be discerned. See Gusfield 1963. The
community’s ruling elite inevitably finds itself in an odd position, a position which
potentially can severely challenge its authority as a justice insurer. The ruling elite
must select which values within the community it must advance and then either
selectively enforce laws and punishments, or attempt to obliterate a portion or all of
the class of violators. Irrespective of this problem, if a justice system is to respond in
an effective way to organised crimes, it must seek, quite naturally, to develop its
coalition of support in order to expand not only its budgetary/personnel resources
and their enforcement power, but its will to pass and enforce laws proscribing the
offensive behaviours. See Becker 1963.
47 Credibility of the Rwanda Tribunal is unlikely to materialise among Hutus because
they are its main targets. The prosecution of Tutsis is essential for the tribunal’s 
legitimacy. In the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the prosecution of Bosnians and
Croats – and not just Serbs – would enhance that tribunal’s legitimacy in the eyes of
perpetrators across the board.
48 It is interesting to note that the RPF government wanted the Rwanda Tribunal situated
in Rwanda so that it would teach the ‘Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the
impunity to which it had become accustomed... and to promote national reconciliation’.
But this is only possible if the tribunal enjoys some credibility with the perpetrators.
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What the ICTR (as well as the international community) hopes to
achieve, it cannot achieve with the current prioritisation of objectives. The
ICTR hopes to bring about a discontinuous jump, by breaking the vicious
cycle of human rights violations through an international presence that is little
felt in Rwanda itself. The deep-seated animosity between these two segments
of the Rwandese population will not be dispelled easily by a few years of inter-
national justice. The animosity and hatred was cultivated, reinforced and
manipulated for over six decades by the colonial powers, then well nurtured by
the Hutu leaders who ascended to power after independence. It has taken
close to a century to achieve a well-entrenched social structure pegged on
ethnic stratification, founded on deep-seated hatred.49 This is not to say that
the effort at prosecution is an exercise in futility. Obviously there are actors
around, otherwise the structure would not operate. Individual guilt, leading to
prosecution is important, but it should not detract from the flaws in the
Rwandese social structure. The actor-oriented perspective draws its strength
from its simplistic concreteness: its ability at capturing concrete actors, the
individuals. But only a segment of an actor is in the structure, and only a part
of the structure shows up in any one particular actor. While the ICTR’s
indictees may have been architects of the genocide, they simply tapped into
the huge reservoir of ethno-centric hate that had been entrenched in the sub-
consciousness of Hutus and was converting a great deal of them into
pathological killers.
Having a positive impact on a complex socio-political process is not the
same as successfully prosecuting a person for a criminal violation of human
rights law in accord with the law. Only by seeking to address the causal
factors of the genocide will the ICTR translate its prosecutorial victories into
victory for human rights in Rwanda. The ICTR should provide an institutional
framework that will contribute to the extremely complex process of moving a
society from one characterised by massive human rights violations to one
built upon the respect of human rights law. A key oversight in the ICTR’s
prosecutorial strategy is that it does not seek to address the accumulation of
collectively organised evil within the Rwandese society, entrenched over a
period of almost one century.50
49 See Part 2 of the article.
50 See generally Destehexhe 1995; Ryckmans 1931; Prunier 1995.
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Having reviewed the ICTR’s focus on the actor and his/her disjunction
from the structure, the article now turns to consider classical criminal law
theories on which the ICTR is premised, and their inadequacy. The failure of
these criminal law theories in addressing the Rwandese situation is a neces-
sary consequence of the ICTR’s disjunction of actor and structure.
4. The ICTR: Hooded by Classical Criminal Law Theories 
The recognised punishment objectives of a court system fall within the gener-
ally accepted spectrum of deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and
incapacitation.51 The international penal process at the ICTR seems focused
on deterrent, retributive and incapacitative aspects of the criminal process
with little pragmatic effort to incorporate rehabilitative and restorative
aspects into its overall strategy. 
Virtually all theories of criminal justice can be characterised as either
retributive or deterrent (utilitarian).52 For utilitarians, punishment is justified
to the extent that it produces a socially desirable consequence, ordinarily
general deterrence.53 In contrast, consequences are irrelevant for retribution-
ists. Rather, they consider it simply morally fitting that criminal offenders are
punished.54 Described by Robert Solomon, ‘the desire for retribution is the
desire for vengeance[,]…getting even, putting the world back in balance’
(Solomon 1990:41).
In terms of contributing to the development of a world understanding of
human rights and the need to respect them, the Tribunal, via the media, has
made a specific educative contribution to justice work.55 The contribution of
publicising evil acts, although worthy, alone falls far short of meeting a
51 One scholar from a human rights perspective has attempted to look at some of these
punishment objectives as they relate to sentencing options for the ICTR. See
Schabas 1997:461.
52 See Rawls 1988:38; De Haan 1990:103, noting that all theories of punishment are
based on retribution and deterrence.
53 See Cederblom 1977:3.
54 See Berns1988:85 (stating that we punish criminals principally to pay them back).
55 Creating a human rights culture is a complex process in which education and public
awareness play a critical role. See Asmal 1992:28.
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comprehensive punishment objective for a court system. An increase in inter-
national awareness of the Rwandan atrocities probably does not equate to
generally deterring the ethno-centric philosophy of hate deep down in the
sub-consciousness of the armed Hutu militia and ex-government soldiers
conducting bloody military excursions in and around Rwanda. 
The Deterrence Theory
Whether the offence is tax evasion or genocide, deterrence theory presupposes
a rational, utility-maximising actor. Persons commit crimes, so the theory
goes, when the expected value of doing so exceeds the cost of punishment. To
reduce crime, society need only raise the price by imposing harsh penalties.
In the real world, James Gilligan identifies ‘only’ four problems with this
model: ‘It is totally incorrect, hopelessly naive, dangerously misleading, and
based on complete and utter ignorance of what violent people are actually like’
(Gilligan 1996:94-95). 
Much of the Tutsi minority, historically dominant, lives with the phobia
of its physical elimination, while the Hutu majority demands proper political
representation. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has heightened the fears of the
minority, leading Tutsi extremist elements to undertake ruthless actions
against Hutu populations. Hutu extremists, in turn, are reinforced and
supported from outside the country by some of the perpetrators of the
Rwandese genocide. In such an environment, the voices of moderation are
being drowned out, silenced or eliminated altogether.56 An international
justice process that fails to deter individuals with reason enough to value
their lives and freedom can only be regarded as meaningless.
Killings in Rwanda rose in the period after its founding.57 Although
currently the number of killings inside Rwanda has decreased compared to
1998, killings of unarmed civilians and ‘disappearances’ were still reported
throughout 1999 and 2000. As government troops regained control of the
northwest, the armed conflict abated and the level of violence decreased.
56 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, UN SCOR, 51st Sess,
para 3, UN Doc S/1996/116 (1996).
57 The genocidal militia continued the killing. The territory in which it is operating and
the numbers of victims have rose steadily in 1997. In response, killing by Rwandan
government forces also increased. See US Department of State, Rwanda Country
Report on Human Rights Practices (1997).
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However, the situation remained tense and the peace fragile. In many
respects, the armed conflict during which thousands of civilians had been
killed in Rwanda in 1998 continued over the border in the DRC. The presence
of armed groups continued to be reported sporadically in Rwanda near the
DRC border and the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) (formerly the rebel RPF)
carried out military operations in this area (Amnesty International 2000).
The complexity of the Rwandan situation and the operations of the
ICTR would frustrate those who advocate punishment as deterrence.
Societies engulfed by mass political violence are not particularly conducive
to rational behaviour or fears of eventual apprehension. How can we expect
individuals to make a calculated rational choice when they are surrounded by
hysteria, social chaos, panic, coercion, prejudice, and a government that is
exhorting mass violence?58 Layered on top of the irrational context in which
mass violence operates, is the reality that an individual’s decision to act
violently may not be perceived as a legal or even a moral wrong. When taken
together, these two factors support the conclusion that choices to participate
in mass violence may be only slightly, if at all, deterred by the prospect of
eventual prosecution – especially if undertaken by some distant international
tribunal. If those committing the barbarities do not expect to lose power to the
victims (or to third parties such as international authorities), they may not
take the threat of penal sanction very seriously.59
58 Yet the ICTR and the ICTY seek to achieve this goal of utilitarian deterrence. See
Schabas 1997:461,498 (stating that: ‘[R]eferring implicitly to the notion of deter-
rence, the Security Council affirmed its conviction that the work of the two tribunals
“will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted”. The effective prosecu-
tion and punishment of offenders is therefore intended to deter others from
committing the same crimes, and perhaps to convince those already engaged in such
behaviour that they should stop.’ (Footnote omitted in which the Statute of the ICTY is
quoted). The judgments of the ICTR reveal the importance the tribunal accords to
deterrence. See Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case No ICTR-96-3, P 475 (International
Criminal Tribunal. for Rwanda 6 December 1999) <http://www.ictr.org/> (stating that:
‘[T]he penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must be
directed, ...at deterrence, namely to dissuade for ever [sic] others who may be tempted
in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international
community shall not tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law
and human rights.’); and Prosecutor v Musema, Case No ICTR-96-13-T, P 986
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 27 January 2000) <http://www.ictr.org/>.
59 See Minow1998:50: ‘Individuals who commit atrocities on the scale of genocide are
unlikely to behave as “rational actors,” deterred by the risk of punishment.’
77
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Punishments in Rwanda, even if they are imposed to any real extent by
the ICTR, will be meted out slowly, given limited resources (Howland &
Calathes 1998:151). The fact that cases are handled in a slow and circuitous
manner contravenes the axiom that for deterrence to work punishments must
be meted out with swiftness and certainty (Burns & Hart 1970, Newman
1983). It is unrealistic to presuppose that a new institution operating in the
Rwandan genocidal context could act efficiently enough for the desired deter-
rent impact to be realised. Approximately 125 000 individuals – roughly ten
per cent of the adult male Hutu population – are incarcerated in Rwandan jails
designed to hold 15 000.60 At the present rate of national trials, it would take
hundreds of years to adjudge all of these detainees (see McKinley 1997:§1,3).
The ICTR is not of much help either in reducing the number of detainees, after
spending over 200 million dollars; it has indicted 53 individuals and heard
only nine cases.61
Seemingly, the ICTR’s presence is not having the intended sobering
effect on the Hutu extremists. This would be largely because the general
stance of the international community is to view the genocide in terms of a
sudden event, the evil act of the evil actor, and thus the international penal
process is seen as a remedy. But the evil act rests within a large part of the
population, something permanent, the permanent evil intent among extrem-
ists in both groups wrought by a volatile social structure pegged on
deep-seated animosity that has spawned a strong culture of hatred and ethnic
rift. 
While the creation of the ICTR may have a lasting effect on the applica-
tion of humanitarian law to both international and domestic conflicts, and
accomplish what its first Prosecutor Goldstone stated as the significant task of
placing human rights squarely on the international agenda (Tyler 1996), the
Tribunal will not make a significant contribution if it fails to generate
substantial appreciation on the part of Hutus of the extreme criminality of
60 See Integrated Reg’l Info Network for Cent & E Afr (IRIN-CEA), United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Update No 509 (24
September 1998) <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/index.phtml>; Drumbl 2000:571;
Morris 1997:352.
61 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (visited 16 September 2000)
<http://www.ictr.org>; see also See John Prendergast & David Smock, US Inst of




acts of the mass killings, and on the part of the Tutsis, of the fact that recip-
rocal counter-measures, whether low intensity or not, amount to crimes based
on the same legal standards that the Hutus face.
It is not enough that the international penal process classifies the
behaviour as wrong, extremely distasteful and the acts as international
crimes. Until the Hutus (and extremists among the Tutsis who may have a
vision of grand vengeance) are capable of doing so, they will not abstain from
the act, they will not have a bad conscience, and they will disapprove of the
State or international community applying the normal standards built into
national law and international treaties. Thus the extremists see their post-
genocidal intention and actions in another direction: killing yes, but not with
the intent of wiping out the other group, but with the intention of avenging
their own personal losses, and furthering themselves and their ethnic 
hegemony through erosion and attrition of the other group in numbers. As
Drumbl (2000:607) notes:
One reason trials in Rwanda have not been very successful in promoting
a national historical narrative of the genocide is that they have failed to
produce a sense of individual responsibility or blameworthiness among
prisoners. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners we interviewed
do not believe they did anything ‘wrong,’ or that anything really ‘wrong’
happened in the summer of 1994 in Rwanda. Many detainees see them-
selves as prisoners of war, simply ending up on the losing side. In fact,
the prisoners do not even call the events of April to July 1994 the ‘geno-
cide,’ but, instead, refer to these events as ‘the war’.62
The Retributive Theory
The liberal vision of reducing crime by attacking its social causes was essen-
tially supplanted in the late 1970s by retributive schemes requiring that
criminals get their ‘just deserts’ (see Rutherford 1993:15-16). These retribu-
tive schemes reflect the belief that it is morally fitting that offenders be made
to suffer (see Rawls 1988:37-38). The ICTR is imbued with like sentiment
and the characteristic self-righteous tenor of those striving to secure the
‘deserved’ punishment of others. This is not surprising, for a look at Security
62 Conflating the genocide with the war against the RPA contains faulty reasoning. 
See Gourevitch 1998:98-99: ‘[A]lthough the genocide coincided with the war, its
organisation and implementation were quite distinct from the war effort.’
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Council proceedings regarding the aims of the ICTR unearths a majoritarian
view by participating States favouring the ‘just deserts’ discourse.63
Before its renaissance, retribution was widely considered a dead letter,
particularly among liberal theorists like H.L.A. Hart.64 In the words of Hannah
Arendt (1963:254), ‘[w]e refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions
“that a great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for
vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can
restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to punish
the criminal”’. There is perhaps no greater canard than the idea that punitive
justice provides needed therapy for individuals; that nothing can assuage
anger or restore dignity like punishment. The emphasis on victimhood, blame,
and powerlessness may actually undermine recovery from violent crime.
Retributionists believe that if offenders are not punished for their
crimes, then other people will not respect the criminal law and not obey it.
For this school of thought, the focus is on the development of strategies for
administering the courts, the police and the prisons more effectively (see e.g.
Benekos 1992:4-5). Retribution attracts people that want a quick fix crime
solution. Its usefulness as a tool for building a strong culture of justice in
developing nations is therefore limited. Retribution merely shifts the revenge
over from the individual to the State (Howland & Calathes 1998:153).
Around 125 000 people have been detained in prisons and detention
centres across Rwanda, most accused of participation in the 1994 genocide.
Many are being held without charge or trial for prolonged periods in condi-
tions amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Arbitrary arrests
have been reported. Detainees in local detention centres and in military
custody are ill-treated. At least 1 420 people were tried for participation in
the 1994 genocide. In 1999 at least 180 were sentenced to death. A number
of detainees who were released were re-arrested, including several who had
been tried and acquitted (Amnesty International 2000). This only serves to
reinforce the hard feelings between the two groups, as it appears to be some
kind of victor’s justice, that may even turn the pacific sentiments held by
moderate Hutus into bitterness. Specifically referring to the Rwandan
proceedings, Minow (1998:124) concludes that ‘[r]ather than ending the
63 See UN Doc. S/PV. 3453 (1994).
64 See Hart 1988:15 (stating that ‘a cloud of doubt has settled over the keystone of
‘retributive’ theory’). See also Braithwaite & Pettit 1990:2, and Primoratz 1989:71.
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cycles of revenge, the trials themselves were revenge’. No doubt the Hutu
extremists will be itching for a chance to pay back the Tutsis in their own coin
in the future.
The willingness to punish the unusual is a basic criminal law philosophy.
But if an actor commits an act that can be seen as ‘normal’ in the precise sense
that the other actors in the same position would commit the same acts in the
same situation, the justice process is then seen as motivated by vengeance.
Mass violence constitutes what Carlos Santiago Nino (1996:7), citing Kant,
calls ‘radical evil’.65 ‘Radical evil’ amounts to violence in situations where
acting violently is simply not deviant. Nino (1996:ix) observes that ‘the kind of
collective behaviour that leads to radical evil would not have materialised
unless carried out with a high degree of conviction on the part of those who
participated in it’. When this conviction is broadly shared, it loses its deviance
no matter how pronounced its ugliness. Thus the extremists may see the inter-
national penal process as the consequence of their loss of political and military
authority in Rwanda, and not so much as a process aimed specifically at their
push to homogenise Rwanda and the resulting atrocities. On the other hand,
the Tutsis are more focused on the national trials that will send the guilty to the
gallows, not some ritzy international trial that will send the guilty to Europe.
The ICTR has 53 indictees, 45 of whom are in custody66 and the
Rwandese prisons have some 125 000 individuals in custody over the geno-
cide. The fact though is that between 75 000 to 150 000 possible defendants,
spread throughout Rwanda and in neighbouring countries as refugees, will
never see the inside of a courtroom (Jefremovas 1995). What about them? Do
they get the message that their actions were wrong and atrocious? For some,
yes; for most, unlikely. Journalist Philip Gourevitch (1998:34,123) asks and
then eerily concludes: ‘[W]hat if…murder and rape become the rule?’ ‘During
the genocide, the work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it
was effectively the law of the land…’. The ICTR relies on the actor-oriented
65 Nino 1996:vii adds the following description: ‘“[R]adical evil” [refers to] offences
against human dignity so widespread, persistent, and organized that normal moral
assessment seems inappropriate’.
66 This figure is as of 31 October 2000. Of the 45 in custody, 41 were held at the ICTR’s
detention facility at Arusha, and three others were awaiting transfer from other parts
of the world. See ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the ICTR’, 19 October 2000,
Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-13-018.
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approach in which it is easy to see who should be apprehended, arraigned into
court, adjudicated and eventually punished.67 This objective does not tend to
build dynamism and dialectics into the ICTR’s vision of not only prosecuting
the guilty, but also addressing impunity. The ICTR seeks to depict and 
regulate an event where certain acts are proscribed. The rest is left open.
What the ICTR ultimately seeks through incarceration is an authoritative
expression of moral condemnation. Suffering is to be inflicted on the genocide
architects so as to demonstrate the international community’s abhorrence of
the destruction of life. H.L.A. Hart (1963:65-66),68 among others, assailed
such expressive justice, describing it as ‘uncomfortably close to human sacri-
fice as an expression of religious worship’. Reprobation and denunciation are
important aspects of social ordering, but remote, atomised penal institutions
are a dubious means to this end. As Drumbl (2000:1324-1325) notes:
The social engineering contemplated by retributive criminal justice does
little to address the structural sources of the mythology of ethnic superi-
ority in a society such as Rwanda’s. Trials create a bipolar leitmotiv of
the postgenocidal society, which is binarily deconstructed into the
‘guilty’ and the ‘innocent’. This deconstruction runs the risk of oversim-
plifying history by negating the importance of collective wrongdoing,
acquiescent complicity, and the embeddedness of ‘radical evil’. By
treating genocidal violence as an individualised, pathological, and
deviant transgression of social propriety, the criminal justice system
may do the dualist postgenocidal society a disservice by blanketing and
perpetuating the structural nature of this violence to the detriment of
survivors and future generations. Blaming occurrences of radical evil
entirely on the existence of some evil people obscures the fact that so
many people, to varying degrees of complicity, are required for ‘radical
evil’ to operate publicly on a macro level.
The article now turns to an exploration of the restorative dimension of justice
and its potential to offer a more viable and pragmatic paradigm to the ICTR as it
pursues its objectives. The restorative paradigm’s strength derives from its
appreciation of both the actor and the structure within which the actor operates.
67 The mathematics of the process are ridiculous when you consider the number of
indictees in relation to the overall figure of possible defendants.
68 Quoted by Kahan 1996:591,596.
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Rediscovering the Restorative Dimension of Justice
In criminological theory, the restorative justice paradigm is often preferred as
the principal alternative to retributive justice (Hudson & Galaway
1999:332,333). Criminologists Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway (1999:332-
333) posit three elements as fundamental to restorative justice: 
First, crime is viewed primarily as a conflict between individuals that
results in injuries to victims, communities, and the offenders them-
selves, and only secondarily as a violation against the state [or the
international community]. Second, the aim of the criminal justice
process should be to create peace in communities by reconciling the
parties and repairing the injuries caused by the dispute. Third, the
criminal justice process should facilitate active participation by
victims, offenders, and their communities in order to find solutions to
the conflict.69
Concrete objectives and compassion must characterise justice in Rwanda,
based on human rights and a restorative perspective. This process should
explicitly engage all relevant players by bringing about peace on all levels
and joining ends to means. In other words, the justice system should be
engaged in peace making. The radical nature of peace making is clear. There
must be a transformation of the human being and an understanding that there
can be no peace without justice. As currently conceived and understood the
ICTR’s objectives provide little guidance. A serious analysis of its various
objectives, by sifting out those that are unrealistic, can achieve greater
clarity. If the ICTR thinks it must achieve all of the objectives alone, it would
be bound for failure.70
A particularly questionable position of the ICTR is its equation of
punishment and justice. Gandhi recognised that criminal punishment signi-
fies the antithesis of justice.71 He disdained peace attained through punitive
measures, and dismissed an international police force as ‘a concession to
69 See also Minow 1998:91: ‘Unlike punishment, which imposes a penalty or injury for
a violation, restorative justice seeks to repair the injustice, to make up for it, and to
effect corrective changes in the record, in relationships, and in future behaviour.’
70 See Gordon 1995:217,234 (where she discusses how the ICTR is ill conceived and
success is virtually impossible, given the enormity of the task at hand).
71 See Iyer 1986:498: ‘Peace must be just. In order to be that, it must be neither puni-
tive nor vindictive.’
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human weakness, not by any means an emblem of peace’ (Iyer 1986:498).
Gandhi recognised that institutionally inflicted punishment constitutes
violence that no amount of justification can make intrinsically good or indica-
tive of virtue. To equate prosecutions with justice in a position of collective
criminal responsibility is illiberal.
The ICTR seems to overlook the fact that it is not only prosecution of its
indictees that is central to the question of solving the Rwandese situation.
There has to be an effort to identify that there are other units, individuals or
groups that should be the target of efforts to restore order to the badly 
fractured society. Backing a remedy designed to socialise individuals, the
ICTR envisions a society disintegrated into an amoral Hobbesian war of all
against all, rather than into rival moral communities. Deftly noted by Dennis
Wrong, for group-level conflict to occur, the individual group members must
already ‘have been socialised to…correctly gauge the expectations of others,
internalise at least some norms, and possess selves sensitive to the appraisal
of others’ (Wrong 1994:182).72 The familiar lack of remorse shown for acts
that if committed against a member of one’s own group would draw heavy
censure, signals a disjunction between groups’ values and norms.
The ICTR’s seeming view that applying individual level justice will
promote social order will not and cannot work if it is the only tool envisaged.
Individual level punishments can only affect a permanent change if the cause
of the deviant behaviour resides solely with the individual (Newman 1978). In
Rwanda, however, it is impossible to conclude that the causes of deviance
reside with the individual. As the ICTR is focusing its attention on individual
deviants, it is presenting the world, and the Rwandans, with the image of a
person who needs correcting through punishment instead of a social system,
structurally stratified by ethnic rift that needs reorganisation. The Tribunal,
while an important instrument by which those responsible for the genocide
are distinguished from moderate Hutus, should nonetheless be alive to the
destabilising effect being posed by Hutu extremists, many of who are not in
custody, and are unlikely to ever face prosecution. 
While the prosecution of former leaders is an essential ingredient 
for reconciliation at the political level, there has to be a corresponding 
transformation of values among the Rwandan people who have been
72 For instance, in both Nazi Germany and Rwanda in the 1990s, a strong tradition of
obedience to authority prevailed. See Gerhart 1996:156; Thompson-Noel 1996:xvi.
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subjected to decades of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence, whether as
victim or as obedient perpetrator. The Tutsi must absolve the Hutu of indefi-
nite collective responsibility for the genocide while also having a legitimate
means of vindicating their suffering through a ‘collective catharsis’. The
ICTR in concert with the Rwanda national trials can play a decisive role 
in this respect. Structures cannot be juridical persons with intentions and
capabilities. They cannot distinguish between right and wrong. While 
structures cannot be put on trial, they can be changed through rehabilitation,
by focusing on them as the primary root of the problem as well as the 53
indictees of the tribunal. Possibly the ICTR can lay ground for a new
paradigm combining the actor-oriented and structure-oriented perspectives,
promoting an international law that truly permeates the human populace, not
stopping at the gates of the State but bridging the gap between collective 
and individual actors better than it has done so far. The key condition for 
such change is consciousness, and more sensitivity to the actor-structure
relationship. Alongside trials, public inquiries must be made to reveal the
weaknesses of the structure and help ensure that the Rwanda situation is not
simply a change of guard, one ethnic hegemony for another.
Kent Roach (1995:268-270) presents the notion of accountability as
operating on three levels: literal accountability (‘a process in which individ-
uals are forced to account for their actions’); organisational accountability 
(‘a process where organisations are called to account for events and policy
failures’); and social accountability (‘a complex process that depends on
social recognition of the problem being investigated and subsequent demands
by the interested public that individuals, organisations and society account
for their response to the problem’). Roach’s review of public inquiries73
73 Roach (1995:269) explored the effectiveness of three Canadian public inquiries in
promoting accountability. These three inquiries related to (1) illegal activities by
members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the McDonald Commission), (2)
the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr, and (3) aboriginal justice in the
province of Manitoba. The Manitoba Aboriginal justice inquiry was ‘more concerned
with promoting social accountability for the treatment of Aboriginal people and
viewed even individual misconduct as a symptom of larger social and political 
problems’ (Roach 1995:289). The ‘“social function” of the Manitoba inquiry was
crucial’ (Roach 1995:288). In the end, however, there was a definite trickle-down
effect, as social accountability may encourage ‘people [to] begin to question their
own attitudes and behaviour and those of others’ (Roach 1995:288).
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reveals that their unique institutional features allow them to hold organisa-
tions and society accountable in ways that courts cannot.74
Attention should be paid to how reconciliation can be facilitated in
today’s Rwanda. Adopting a restorative approach may be part of the answer.
The restorative school of criminal justice demonstrates the importance of
behavioural, material, emotional, and cognitive outcomes for victims,
offenders, and societal members (see Alper & Nichols 1981). Success in
sanctioning is measured by the degree of reparation for the victims and their
participation, or even better, their ownership, in the process. It also includes
the recognition of the offenders of wrongdoing and their level of empathy with
victims. It is further measured by the development of a shared perspective in
society that offenders have been denounced and held accountable in a fair
process. The Rwandese courts may appear to lack credibility with the group
of perpetrators, overwhelmingly Hutu, being prosecuted by an overwhelm-
ingly Tutsi government. Ethnic stratification is replayed, as basically the
Tutsis are prosecuting the Hutus, and the victors are entombing their victory
through judicial process. It may very well be the case that the Rwandan
national trials may be enhanced by closer, formal co-operation between the
national and international process, to alleviate the credibility problem.
While the Rwandan courts have received mixed, and to a degree
improving, reviews, many of the first trials have been considered a disaster
from a due process perspective. Most of the more than 125 000 detainees have
been arbitrarily arrested and have been detained for long periods without
trial.75 To many in Rwanda, this process negatively colours their impression of
the Rwandan government and its ability to treat fairly those accused of geno-
cide. The Rwandan trials will not help achieve reconciliation if they are
considered unfair or if they are removed from the population.76 Rwanda itself
was warned when advocating for the creation of a tribunal with international
74 See Roach 1995:273: ‘[M]ost courts continue to put individuals, not organisations,
on trial. They stress individual responsibility for wrongs and not the structural short-
comings of institutions, even if only organisational reform can prevent similar wrongs
in the future’.
75 For an interesting history of the Rwandan government’s attempt to respond to the
genocide and mass killings with its justice system, see Schabas 1996:523.
76 Although the understanding of a community’s perception of law and legal process is
underdeveloped, especially in a place like Rwanda, fairness and morality are impor-
tant. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley 1995.
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participation of ‘victor’s justice’ if it organised the trials on its own.77
In the absence of a working strategy between the international and
national processes, the ICTR continues to deal with individual criminals and
not with a culture of impunity. After all, the majority in the Security Council
believed neutrality and independence of the ICTR was more important than a
connection to the social process in Rwanda. For the Rwandese it has became
evident that independent justice means a justice that Rwanda will have no
influence over, including the creation of a prosecutorial strategy.78 The struc-
tural distance of the ICTR from the Rwandan social process makes it very
difficult for the ICTR’s work to be relevant and even more unlikely that its
work will address the root causes of the genocide.
It would seem to be the case in Rwanda, that lasting reconciliation
requires assigning individual responsibility for the atrocities, while it is
regarded as imperative that trials of those accused take place. Clearly, the
most resonant of such trials will be those in Rwanda, organised and accom-
plished by the Rwandan people, so that individual responsibility is an
internal, rather than an external designation.79 It follows that the high profile
of the ICTR should not overshadow and steal the ‘thunder’ from the national
trials. It would seem though that that is precisely what has happened: the
ICTR has just about all the ‘big fish’, while the rest have been left to the
Rwandese national courts. 
The major reason why the international and national justice systems
may fail to respond adequately to the Rwandese situation is that they seem to
think inadequately about the crimes by defining them only as law breaking.
The concentration is solely on the resulting adversarial relationship between
government (or Tribunal) and the criminal offender. This existing pattern of
thinking fails to address, or even recognise, the other dimensions involved. 
A human rights crime is not merely an offence against the State. Likewise,
justice is more than punishment and incapacitation. There are larger issues at
77 Letter, dated 28 September 1994, from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to
the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council.
78 Some commentators have noted this disconnection from the internal political
process. See Meier Wang 1995:177,203.
79 The war crimes trials taking place in Ethiopia provide an example of a process that
may bring about such internal recognition. See Deming 1995:421,424, and New York
Times 1994:A8.
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play, notably the issue of standards and norms. Despite the public nature of
the genocidal violence, there is very little generally accepted truth in Rwanda
as to what exactly happened from April to July 1994.80 In this regard, a truth
commission could help establish a historical narrative of what happened as
well as why it happened.81 After this record is established, Rwandan society
could then be better positioned to render a moral evaluation of the genocide.82
In a deeply divided society, arguably the only type of society likely to
produce the types of crimes for which the ICTR was established, criminal
prosecutions do not necessarily have a conciliatory effect. Rather, they mani-
fest and exacerbate division if they are seen as some sort of panacea. This
follows in part because those who would occupy the dock are inevitably and
widely seen as symbolic representatives of their group.83 The association is
even greater in cases involving ‘big fish’. As the prosecution declared at the
80 But see Neier (1999:43), suggesting that because of the public nature of the violence,
the truth process in Rwanda would fail to make an important contribution. Neier is
correct in pointing out that the fact that the genocide was committed so publicly
means many people knew about it. But reports from Rwanda reveal that there is
little, if any, shared understanding as to the wrongfulness of the violence. There is an
important difference between the genocide generally being known and the wrong of
the genocide meaningfully being acknowledged.
81 See Jose Zalaquett’s Comments at Harvard Law School Human Rights Program,
concluding that truth commissions ‘are most useful where broad sectors of society do
not…acknowledge critical facts’ (Zalaquett 1992:1425,1431).
82 So far, there has never been a truth commission in Rwanda with powers to compel 
testimony, order reparations, or promote offender reintegration. There have been inves-
tigations and inquiries, but these have not directly involved Rwandans in an organised,
institutional process. This is not surprising since the purpose of these investigations
was not to forge reconciliation or allocate reparations. In 1994, a commission of
experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, prepared a prelimi-
nary report on violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda. See Letter from
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General, United Nations, to the President of the
Security Council, Annex: Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN Doc S/1994/1405 (Dec 9,
1994). The report of this commission of experts was a first step in the formation of the
ICTR. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights established a
‘special investigations unit... to gather evidence that might otherwise have been lost or
destroyed’. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of the
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda Submitted Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 50/200, p 15, at 5, UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/111 (1996).
83 See Simic 1997:12, stating that Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic ‘are taken as
embodiments of the soul of their people’.
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opening of the Adolf Eichmann trial, ‘It is not an individual that is in the
dock[,]…but anti-Semitism throughout history’ (Arendt 1963:16). Given its
metaphorical significance, one can hardly expect the ICTR to ameliorate
collective guilt. On the contrary, it may actually revive and inflame antago-
nistic sentiment.84
The overall purpose of restorative justice is the reintegration of victims
and offenders who have resolved their conflicts into safe communities (see
Van Ness & Strong 1997). This purpose can only be achieved when multiple
parties (victims, offenders, communities, governments) pursue multiple goals
(redress, fairness, healing, and rehabilitation). There have been killings of a
number of unarmed civilians, some by members of the Rwandese security
forces, others by armed opposition groups (the Interahamwe militia), and
others by unidentified assailants. Members of local defence forces have been
responsible for killings and other abuses, especially in the northwest of
Rwanda, sometimes in conjunction with RPA soldiers (Amnesty International
2000).85 This certainly reinforces the need to pursue multiple goals within the
framework of objectives of the international justice system, otherwise the
international community will have to find an alternative way to address
human rights abuses by an overzealous Tutsi-dominated army, clearly having
personal and official business weaved into a single tapestry. The more holistic
perspective of restorative justice may actually help a society manage multiple
goals because it identifies restoration – not deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, or retribution – as the overarching goal of criminal justice. 
A restorative approach seems needed in all societies that have suffered
massive and collective victimisation, and must be kept in mind in Rwanda by
the ICTR as it maps out and implements its strategy (Howland & Calathes
1998:156).
There is scant evidence of analysis devoted to identifying the intended
beneficiary and target audience of international prosecutions. The omission
bolsters suspicions voiced by a Rwandan delegate to the United Nations that
84 See Rosenberg (1998:46,56) remarking on the ‘near-universal belief among Serbs
that the tribunal is an anti-Serb instrument’.
85 For a positive development, see Wanyonyi’s (2001) commentary, noting the UN
Prosecutor’s announcement that the members of the RPA (formerly the rebel RPF)
will be investigated for alleged killings during the genocide period when the RPF
launched a major military offensive that brought the Tutsis to power.
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the ICTR exists to appease the conscience of the international community, not
to provide enduring value to the ravaged community.86 The subject and object
of humanitarian efforts in the wake of human rights disasters must be the
community directly affected by and implicated in the events. If the intended
beneficiary of international prosecutions is the amorphous ‘international
community’, the ICTR has to identify and examine the implications that follow
from this premise. The mere occurrence of serious human rights violations is
itself indicative of the inadequacy of international recourse and remedies to
ameliorate the security dilemma so prevalent in post-modern civil war.
The ugliness of the genocidal conflagration and the political reality of
the ethnic hatred cannot be isolated into an international courtroom for 
resolution. The ICTR will make more sense if it was part of a comprehensive
domestic and international process of punishment, reconstruction, and recon-
ciliation. The Rwandese have a greater understanding of what is necessary to
ensure that prosecutions meet the nation’s most important objectives. They
are the people who are at the same time in struggle and co-operation, in asso-
ciation and disassociation. A complementary twin approach by the national
and international penal process through some synchronic formula may hit at
the structure by challenging it through judicial activity. This may contribute
to the Rwandese seeing their divided socio-political structure as one of the
primary sources of their tragedy and trying to withdraw from or change it.
A presupposition of the ICTR is that formal mechanisms are integral 
to uphold group life and to stem deviant behaviour.87 Reminiscent of pre-
sociological thought, this view overlooks the ‘complex network of social ties
which spontaneously creates a normative order that exists independently of
(legal institutions)’ (Wrong 1994:170).88 Co-operation and understanding by
the Rwandese society is a sine qua non of long term ethno-centric hate control
86 See ‘UN Establishes Rwanda Genocide Tribunal’, Reuters North American Wire, 8
November1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News File.
87 Kofi Annan (1997:363), Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that all
peoples of the world should have basic human rights and that the basis of law
ensures those rights. He thus advocates a formal court to administer that law (see
Annan 1997:365).
88 See also Wrong 1994:49: ‘It is the social process in group life that creates and upholds
the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life.’ See generally Sampson et al
(1997:918-919,923) finding that ‘collective efficacy,’ meaning informal social control,
cohesion, and trust, remains a significant predictor of violent crime.
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and societal restructuring. Although the Tutsis are now in control, they cannot
hold it without the goodwill of the Hutu segment.89 For lasting peace, Nelson
Mandela proclaimed, ‘we do not rely on laws, we rely purely on persuasion’
(Waldmeir 1997:261). Where society depends instead on law, Gandhi
concluded that ‘law ceases to be law, and society ceases to be society’ (Hegde
1989:424).
The inter-ethnic hatred in Rwanda is a ‘deep-culture’, a socio-cultural
code embedded in the collective subconscious of the group entities, defining
for that collective that it is normal/natural to adopt a ‘no-holds-barred’
approach to gaining ethnical supremacy and preserving the resulting ethnic
hegemony. With this subconscious result of almost a century of brainwashing,
there is not much individual awareness of deeply rooted international legal
standards steering the rest of the world. With a deep structure of hatred and
animosity rooted in a culture, the ICTR is running against something very
solid indeed. A signal challenge to the ICTR is the core precept of Satyagraha
– that the ends pre-exist in the means. In Gandhi’s words, ‘the belief that
there is no connection between the means and the end is a great mistake….
The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the
same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is
between the seed and the tree (Dalton 1993:9).
5. Conclusion
If the ideal is to facilitate positive social change in Rwanda that brings 
about reconciliation and the respect for human rights, a system based on 
ill-thought-out symbolic justice or attainable mass retribution must be 
89 Starting in 1999, the Rwandese government implemented a national policy, which
required many people to abandon their homes in order to be housed in new ‘villages’
or settlements known locally as imidugudu. In the northwestern préfectures of Gisenyi
and Ruhengeri, in particular, families were forced to move, sometimes under threat
and intimidation. Some were made to destroy their old homes but were not provided
with assistance to construct new ones. The policy was officially designed to improve
security and ensure greater facilities and infrastructure, but by the end of 1999 living
conditions for hundreds of thousands – especially in the northwest – remained very
poor (Amnesty International 2000). Such structural strategies are definitely wrong, 
at least the aggressive and abrasive stance by the government. In the implementation
of this policy arbitrary arrests and detentions were reported. Unsubstantiated 
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re-oriented with a more thought-out and creative strategy regarding the 
structure and operation of the ICTR. An actor-oriented perspective alone
cannot prevent future human rights violations in Rwanda. It is unable to react
adequately to social evils built into the social structure of the Rwandese
society. The experience of the past six years shows that the vicious cycle of
violence, though somewhat muted, is very much alive.90
It can be argued that by increasing awareness the ICTR has contributed
to the global respect of human rights through its 53 indictments and a few
trials. Unfortunately, the process of reconciliation and the creation of human
rights culture in Rwanda cannot be achieved simply by trying those who are
responsible for shocking crimes. The ICTR must pay greater attention to the
effects and limitations of justice symbolism and to political developments in
order to effectively influence the troubled pacification process in Rwanda.
This may be beyond the capacity of the current ICTR, but it should not be
(Howland & Calathes 1998:166).
A particularly misguided claim of the ICTR is that criminal prosecu-
tions are productive of ‘the truth’. As Madeleine Albright declared during the
UN Security Council meeting to establish the Yugoslav Tribunal, ‘[t]he only
victor that will prevail in this endeavour will be the truth’ (Stewart 1997:12).
Nothing so belies this as the paucity of information about the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda, generated by hundreds of criminal prosecutions, relative to 
the wealth of information about apartheid South Africa, compiled through
non-prosecutorial means.91 The trials’ reductionist, bipolar logic and inher-
ent barriers to the truth conceal and distort history. As noted by Hannah
accusations of participation in the genocide were frequently used as a way of settling
scores or to prevent property owners from reclaiming illegally occupied property. Now
this falls in the structure-oriented perspective which focuses on types of evil, repres-
sion (political) and exploitation (economic). The evils here are clear, but without
presupposing evil actors. See Jesudasan (1987:287) referring to Gandhi’s insight into
the need for any long-term government to have the consent of the governed.
90 A leader of one of the opposition groups, composed mainly of Hutu extremists, stated
in an interview that the struggle will never end, that is, the laying down of arms will
never take place before their demands are met, which inter alia include the return to
the 1992 Constitution, as amounting to an acceptance of guilt to some crime. See,
‘Rebel Leader Says He Is Not In Arusha to Negotiate’, Internews, 24 July 2000. It can
be accessed online at the following URL <http://www.africanews.org/rwanda/ stories>.
91 See Zarembo (1997:70-71), noting that imprisoned Tutsi rebels in Rwanda ‘dispute
their crimes’ and ‘deny that the genocide ever happened’.
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Arendt (1963:3): Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, …and that
all the other questions of seemingly greater import – of ‘How could it
happen?’ and ‘Why did it happen?’, of ‘Why the Jews?’ and ‘Why the
Germans?’, of ‘What was the role of other nations?’… – be left in abeyance.
Both the Rwandan court process and the ICTR’s efforts are flawed, but
incremental positive change can be obtained. It is time to improve the efforts
of the ICTR and the Rwandan government before they reinforce, as opposed
to combat, impunity. Joint projects are needed.92 Policy changes based on 
co-operation and discussions about how to achieve restorative justice are
needed to enhance the efforts of the ICTR and the Rwandan government. 
For their part, the Hutu must be disabused of their racist notions about the
Tutsi, which have been instilled into their minds by extremist leaders through
indoctrination and misinformation.93 Most importantly, they must become
aware of the whole truth of what transpired in 1994 so that they will not fall
victim to the deception and historical revisionism of Hutu extremists. 
The UN and the international community should not be lulled into
thinking that justice will come to Rwanda with an ‘effective’ ICTR, which has
succeeded in securing custody of 45 indictees out of the total number of 53.
The genocide in Rwanda was in fact the product of years of human rights
violations.94 An intense, creative, and sustained intervention involving the
Rwandan government, civil society actors, UN entities, international finan-
cial institutions, and bilateral funding agencies will, therefore, be needed to
address the full spectrum of human rights. While the ICTR can make a
contribution to this process, it can do so only if a process exists and the ICTR
has a rational plan for contributing to it. 
92 Possible projects might include: one that addresses the fact that neither the ICTR
nor the Rwandan government has a complete information collection and manage-
ment system – a system needed to understand the big picture and to develop a
coherent prosecutorial strategy; one that examines ways that the ICTR might allow
for civil damage awards. Both projects could be good starting points for a discussion
regarding a new collaborative arrangement.
93 The Hutu commonly refer to the Tutsi as the ‘inyenzi’ or cockroaches, which must be
crushed. See note 45 above.
94 For example, the lack of sufficient access to quality public education created some of
the conditions whereby leaders could manipulate large portions of the population;
these leaders promoted the lack of tolerance and institutionalised difference between
societal groups.
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